NATO's Bridge Too Far

NATO cannot militarily, logistically, or politically hold the countries of the Caucasus if any of the three are unwisely brought into the alliance.  The people and leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have had this fact made clear since the Russian invasion of Georgia, although they cannot publicly admit it.  Many in Europe and the United States may know this truth as well, but also cannot bring themselves to say so publicly.  In time, we will see Azerbaijan especially, hedging its bets with the United States and NATO in an effort to accommodate Russia.  Georgia is already under greatly increased Russian influence with the presence of Russian soldiers on its territory and in control of the main airbase, national highway artery, and primary port city.  Armenia, which has few if any other alternatives, will also become friendlier toward Russia.  All three countries realize that Russia is just next door, while NATO, particularly the United States, is very far away. 

This creates a new line in Europe, dividing Russian dominated portions from those most influenced by the West.  Ideally, this does not have to be the case as NATO expands to take in every democracy in greater Eurasia.  Realistically, this is the only option NATO, with its current level of political will, has.  The curtain may not be iron, but there is a new divide draped across Europe by a resurgent Russia.  NATO has the choice of where to let this curtain fall.  That choice has to be made considering NATO military and logistic capabilities, as well as political will, not idealistic aspirations of support for unsustainable outposts on the Russian frontier.

In June of 2001, while on a regular trip to Baku as part of my job with the United States Department of State, I was eating dinner with an Azeri national working at the United States Embassy in Azerbaijan.  Our discussion came to the topic of NATO expansion and Azerbaijan's future.  He asked me what the United States would do if Russia attacked Azerbaijan.  I contemplated his question for a few minutes before answering because I did not want to simply say what he wanted to hear, that the United States would be there no matter what.  I knew that was just not true.  Instead of answering right away, I began by talking about the lack of land links between NATO and the Caucasus, except through eastern Turkey.  We agreed that any support would most likely come by air or sea.  Then, I discussed the choke point of the Bosporus Straits in the Black Sea.  NATO may be able to force its way into the Black Sea, but that would be a terribly costly and potentially unsustainable military action against a determined Russian enemy.  Finally, I discussed the possibility of air transport of military equipment and supplies to Azerbaijan.  There is no way we could conduct a sustained air supply campaign into the region against a determined Russian enemy.  Therefore, I told him that, based on the available methods of support, the best he would be able to expect from the United States was rhetoric.  This greatly saddened my Azeri friend, but it was the truth.  I felt it best to offer that over any false illusion. 

Since that conversation, the United States has greatly increased its air assets at Incirlik Air Force Base in Turkey, created the potential for new permanent bases in Iraq, and has forces in Afghanistan as well.  NATO could have greater access to the region through a Turkey that is agreeable to action against Russia or from Iraq and Afghanistan.  Yet, none of these points of access are sustainable as a base of operations in the Caucasus against Russia politically, militarily, or logistically.  Turkey is a NATO member with its own balance of Russia's interests to consider along with its domestic politics.  It showed itself unwilling to support the United States invasion of Iraq as a second front, and most recently would not initially let American military ships to transit the Bosporus to supply aid to Georgia.  This resulted in the first United States Naval vessel arriving at a Georgian port two weeks after the Russian invasion.  The mission in Iraq is a net consumer of American military resources and will take a long time, if ever, to become a stable base from which to conduct out of area operations.  Afghanistan is even more of a drain on NATO and American assets, again lacking the capability to serve as a stable base for sustained military operations in another theater of war.  Therefore, no logistical option exists for NATO to operate against a determined Russia in the Caucasus, if such an enemy were to be confronted. Russia has internal lines, while NATO is on the fringes, having to find a way to enter the region.

NATO, particularly the United States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, have clearly demonstrated the limit of political will each are capable of supplying a democracy on Russia's border.  In an emergency meeting a week after Russia's invasion of Georgia, NATO released a statement that Russia should live up to the cease-fire agreement signed with Georgia and pull its troops back to positions held just prior to the commencement of hostilities.  Rather than demand that Russia remove all of its troops from Georgian territory immediately, backed up by NATO deployments into the region to reinforce the embattled Georgian government, NATO simply slapped Russia on the wrist.  The United States sent some military flights into Georgia to show the flag, but these were lumbering transport aircraft, not air-superiority fighters or ground attack planes that would have demonstrated a commitment to Georgia's defense.  This rhetoric, and extremely modest waving of the flag, was shrugged off by the Russians as no real threat.  Even NATO's insinuation that the NATO-Russia Partnership Council would be at risk turned out to be meaningless words to a Russia that has never really been that interested in the Council’s work.  What this clearly demonstrates is that NATO is not going to the mat for a non-member in a far off land about which the populations of most NATO countries know very little.

The stark realization that NATO has few realistic options to act on the behalf of Georgia has hit Georgia's embattled leadership hard. Unfortunately, the same goes for Azerbaijan and Armenia, both of which are now looking over their shoulder at their strong Russian neighbor and across a vast expanse of water at a clearly fangless NATO. These three countries will be choosing to balance their policies between Russia and NATO, rather than antagonize their neighbor.

Looking at a broader perspective, we can see that as the Caucasus realign to be more accommodating to Russia, NATO and American missions elsewhere will be affected.  Azerbaijan serves as a staging base for NATO and American operations in Afghanistan as well as coalition operations in Iraq.  Basing rights, over flight access, and other permissions given by the Azeri government may be in jeopardy in the future. Such hedging by the countries of the Caucasus will provide Russia with more of a say in NATO's mission in Afghanistan and the coalition mission in Iraq. 

NATO, led by the United States, has not been offering the truth to our friends in the Caucasus.  For almost twenty years we have been building up their confidence, offering them political, financial, and military aid, and the prospect of membership in the alliance.  Like their Baltic brethren who also came out of the Former Soviet Union, the countries of the Caucasus were attracted to NATO because of its Article 5 guarantee that an attack on one constitutes an attack on all.  In May of 2005, United States President George W. Bush even was so bold as to go to Tbilisi and say:

“I am proud to stand beside a president who has shown such spirit, determination and leadership in the cause of freedom. . . As free nations, the United States and Georgia have great responsibilities and together we will do our duty. . .As you build free institutions at home, the ties that bind our nations will grow deeper, as well. We respect Georgia's desire to join the institutions of Europe. We encourage your closer cooperation with NATO. Georgia's leaders know that the peaceful resolution of conflict is essential to your integration into the transatlantic community. At the same time, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia must be respected - the territorial [sic] and sovereignty of Georgia must be respected by all nations.”

President Bush's speech inspired the people and government of Georgia, compelling them to become the third largest contributors of troops to military operations in Iraq.  Georgia is an active participant in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program, and was hoping to begin the Membership Action Plan (MAP) Process to enter the alliance as a full member in the near future.  The Georgian's saw hope in alliance membership, saw themselves tied to The West, and believed that Russia would be deterred from attacking them.  Sadly, the Georgian's were misled by us and mistaken in their assessment of the support they would receive.

The August 7th invasion of Georgia by Russia, triggered by an ill-conceived Georgian attempt to reclaim Georgian sovereign territory, clearly demonstrated that Georgia was on its own.  Similar to the over 17,000 lost British, Polish, American and Canadian soldiers in an ill-conceived attempt to go a bridge too far in World War II, the countries of the Caucasus were sent into a fight where too much ambition met too little understanding of the enemy's determination and combat strength and too little forethought on resolving logistical issues.  Those soldiers who captured the last bridge in the plan were left to their own devices, eventually succumbing to the overwhelming enemy force because they could not be relieved, just as Georgia’s airborne troops were sacrificed at Roksky tunnel.  NATO would be setting the countries of the Caucasus up for yet another catastrophe in the future if membership were offered to them without the capability to fulfill Article 5.    NATO's Bridge Too Far.