Since the mid 19th century proponents of Naval Power
have pointed to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s seminal work The
Influence of Sea Power on History to point to the need for countries to build naval forces in
order to protect their interests. Most industrialized, and even other, countries
since that time spent lavishly on large naval vessels, including Battleships,
Cruisers, Aircraft Carriers, and Destroyers.
Yet, one country that spent this money, building up a formidable fleet
for its time, may have been poorly served, and even defeated in large part
because of this expense. That country is France, and the time period is between
World War I and World War II.
In the inter-War years, France built
the fourth
largest naval force in the world. Targeted
against its main rival, Italy, the French Navy was an expensive burden for the
country, but one deemed essential for its survival by Admiral Darlan,
the man most responsible for its construction. Despite being limited by size
and scale with adherence to The Washington
Treaty of 1922, the French found creative ways to develop and deploy large
surface and sub-surface combatants. Here is a list of the major French combat
craft in May-June of 1940:[14]
- - Modern Battleships: 3
- - Old Dreadnought Battleships: 5
- - Aircraft Carriers: 1
- - Seaplane Carriers: 1
- - Heavy Cruisers: 10
- - Light Cruisers: 10
- - Heavy Destroyers: 32
- - Destroyers: 38
- - Submarines: 80
- - Sloops: 65
Despite the effort put forth to field this powerful
fleet, the French Navy never engaged the Italian fleet in battle during World
War II. Most of the French naval vessels
sat out the war after the Fall of France, eventually succumbing to destruction
at the hands
of their allies or by their own
crews in order for the ships not to fall into German hands. This is where
my proposition on why Mahan may have been wrong in this example comes to the
fore. If one considers the energy and
resources put forward in the development of the French fleet, and the opportunity-cost
associated with its construction, it is easy to wonder how else those resources
could have been actually used in the war.
France perceived its primary opponent at sea to be
Italy. Yet, France was not existentially at risk at sea the way it was by
land. I understand this is Monday morning
quarterbacking, but imagine for a moment that France had used the steel from
most of those ships, particularly the Capital ships, to extend the Maginot Line
across the Benelux frontier, not just across from the German border. Or, had they listened to some of their more attune
to military tactics commanders, and built more tanks and developed proper use
of land warfare doctrine. If France had not had a massive part of its
industrial base focused on a non-existential threat, but rather focused that
industry and manpower toward the land wolf across its
border, it may have been able to counter the smaller army that Germany used to
crush it in 1940.
The French saw themselves as a great power. A great power, according to Mahan, must have
a Navy. Yet, in France’s strategic decision making, a navy was marginal, while
an army was essential. France did have a
large army, but not one designed or built to fight the war that France
experienced. Had France made a different strategic calculation about its
external threats, it may have avoided conquest by Germany.
I do not feel that this is the only case of
countries misallocating resources to potential conflicts that are not the wars
they will actually face. Please let me
know if you know of other examples of this kind of misallocation, or if you
have any comments on this brief assessment of France’s development of a large
navy before World War II.
