Securing a Unified Future: The Effect of CFSP on European Stability

Europe’s development of a foreign policy structure and defense capability will add immense pressure to the already tenuous NATO-Russia relationship.  The ten-year experiment of looking beyond the strategic interests of the European powers in an attempt to achieve cooperation between former adversaries is now over.  The year 1999 destroyed that attempt at cooperation with NATO’s expansion into Central Europe followed immediately by its 11-week air-campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as Russia’s renewed imperialism in Chechnya and the rise of a Russian leader who desires the reassertion of great power status.  These events have not been taking place in a political vacuum, but rather parallel increasing integration between the countries of the European Union (EU) into a political entity with a military capability.  It is that capability of the EU which, if not coordinated properly with the US, will destabilize Europe, and may lead to potential future conflict between a resurgent Russia and an expanding NATO.

The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) called for the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for the EU, and described roughly how such a policy would be implemented.  In 1997 the signing of the St. Malo agreement by the British and French advanced the concept of common European defense from the abstract into the tangible.  Also that year, modifications were made to the concept of implementation of the CFSP through the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was the product of the latest Intergovernmental Conference of the EU.  The creation of a CFSP, in conjunction with the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept, which calls for a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), will potentially create a Europe capable of playing a political role in the field of international security.  Such a Europe, although currently tied to the United States, may find itself with differing political goals than its Trans-Atlantic partner, which could decouple the alliance leading to instability on the continent.

In its February 2 announcement that it does not recognize the Treaty of Tartu the Russian Foreign Ministry has declared its intentions on Estonia and the other Baltic countries which left the Soviet Empire in 1991.  Coming just two weeks after Strobe Talbott, the American Ambassador to the United Nations, announced that the Baltics need to join NATO this begs the question "who's got the nerve to back their position?"  The 10 February announcement by European Commission President Romano Prodi that "Any attack or aggression against an EU member nation would be an attack or aggression against all" demonstrates the answer to this question.  Now, one must ask: Did NATO assign Talbott and Prodi to make those statements?  If not, who did?  What do they mean for the NATO Article 5 guarantee to its members?  And, if this is now NATO-EU policy, can these organizations really follow through on the commitments they just announced?  If this is not NATO-EU policy, than why was such a statement made and not coordinated between them?

To avoid creating instability by delinking the objectives of the US and EU inside of NATO both entities must work together to create a common action plan for Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, as well as the Caucasus.  This plan must address Russian concerns at the expanding nature of both the EU and NATO, and the threat it perceives from the inclusion of its former client states and imperial holdings into these organizations.  As was wise in the initial NATO expansion agreement with Russia, NATO cannot allow any outside state to have a veto over NATO actions, but Russia cannot be left out of decisions either. 

Demonstrated with the Russian race to Pristina airport and continuing threats to pull out of the KFOR, as well as Russian actions in the Caucasus it is obvious that Russia currently has the potential to throw wrenches into NATO’s efforts to maintain peace and stability in Europe.  With the announcement by acting President Alexander Putin that 80% of the 50% increase in Russia’s defense procurement budget will be going toward the purchase of more conventional warfighting equipment, it is clear that Russia is beginning to develop more capabilities to challenge NATO on the ground.  This will only lead to more instability and mistrust between NATO and Russia if Russia’s strategic concerns are not acknowledged when NATO acts.  Russia has realized that its nuclear arsenal (the sole asset it possesses that makes it a world power) is useless to retain a place at the world power table when dealing with proxy wars around Europe and the world.  It has decided that increasing its conventional capabilities as well as courting countries like China, North Korea, Vietnam, Serbia and Iraq will demonstrate that it can still cause headaches for the US and its NATO allies.  This, it hopes, will secure a place for Russia at future decision-making tables. 

NATO, and all NATO members, must speak with one voice when dealing with Russia.  With either the US or the European Union making statements that announce policies which have not been debated in public in NATO countries or open the back door of NATO to security guarantees to countries that are not members, how could Russia not be concerned about its role in maintaining stability in Europe? 

The Cold War is over, but that does not replace the need to address the strategic concerns of Europe’s major powers.  As the past ten years have been the recovery period to the settlement of what was the 75 year war from 1914-1989 to restructure the European balance of power game it must be seen that 1999 was the beginning of play in that game.  It should be recognized that no great power’s interests were taken for granted before World War I without repercussions that eventually led to that 75 years of warfare around the world.  We have an opportunity now to create a security system in Europe that takes into consideration the interests of NATO and Russia, and such a system should be built.  But at the same time, NATO must stay united in its policies towards integrating Central, Eastern, Southern Europe and the Caucasus into the European Security architecture, as well as living up to the commitments it makes to defending those countries.  Setting up confrontation with Russia is not the way to stabilize the situation on the Continent, and making declarations without previous consultations with NATO allies is not the way the European Union should develop its CFSP.  NATO should clarify the Talbott and Prodi statements and Russia should be recognized as the European power that it is.